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Anything for You Big Boy: A Comparative 
Analysis of Banking Regulation in the United 
States and the United Kingdom in Light of the 
LIBOR Scandal 
 
By Christopher Hall* 
 
Abstract: In June 2012, Barclays Bank PLC entered into a settlement agreement with 
the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority and the United States’ 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission that settled Barclays’s role in 
manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR.  The Barclays episode, 
and related scandal, provides an opportunity to examine approaches to financial 
regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States.  This Note uses that 
opportunity to compare and contrast the approach to financial regulation in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  In particular, this Note contends that the 
LIBOR scandal reveals three problems with the then-existing approaches to financial 
regulation in the United Kingdom and United States.  The three issues presented are 
1) a problem with the people involved in setting LIBOR; 2) a problem with the 
publicity that banks face when they submit their rates to LIBOR; and 3) a problem 
with the way LIBOR is calculated that allows it to diverge too far from market 
realities. This Note also argues that the “light-touch” approach that characterizes 
financial regulation in the United Kingdom should be combined with the more 
intensive approach to regulation found in the United States.  The Wheatley Review of 
LIBOR is held up as an example of this hybrid approach.  This Note proceeds by first 
briefly presenting the history of LIBOR as well as presenting an account of the 
manipulation.  The Note then reviews the structure of financial regulation in the 
United Kingdom, with special attention paid to the recent Wheatley Review of LIBOR.  
This Note presents a similar account of financial regulation in the United States, 
before comparing and contrasting the two approaches.  This comparison generates 
the primary thrust of this Note’s argument that the two approaches should be 
combined.  Before concluding, this Note deals with several counter-arguments.  The 
conclusion then explains how the Wheatley Review embodies the hybrid approach 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In late June 2012, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) and Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) announced a settlement 
agreement in which Barclays agreed to pay a fine of £59.5 million ($92.8 
million U.S. dollars) and acknowledged its role in manipulating the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).1  Shortly thereafter, the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) each announced similar settlements.2  All told, Barclays paid 
nearly half a billion dollars to settle with British and American authorities 
for its role in manipulating LIBOR.3  In late 2012 and early 2013, similar 
 
1 See Letter from U.K. Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to Barclays Bank PLC (June 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter Final Notice to Barclays], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-
jun12.pdf. 
2 See In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25 (June 
27, 2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to 
Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to 
Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html. 
3 Alexandra Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays Paying $453 Million to Settle LIBOR Probe, 
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settlements were announced with both the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
UBS.4 
This Note focuses on the structure and philosophy guiding banking 
regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom in light of the 
LIBOR scandal.  The LIBOR scandal provides an interesting opportunity to 
compare the approaches that the authorities in the United States and the 
United Kingdom have taken in regulating an increasingly complex 
financial system.  This Note argues that the LIBOR scandal reveals at least 
three problems that can be used to evaluate financial regulation: (1) a 
problem with the motivations of the people involved in manipulating 
LIBOR; (2) a publicity problem that makes banks fear honesty; and (3) a 
reality problem that lets rate setting become too divorced from real-world 
transactions. 
This Note further argues that the “light-touch” approach to financial 
regulation that has guided regulators in the United Kingdom for much of 
the twenty-first century, which is characterized by a cooperative, principle-
based approach to regulation,5 ought to be reasonably combined with the 
more intensive regulatory scheme of the United States to arrive at a hybrid 
solution.  In responding to a few objections to regulation in the light of the 
recent financial crisis, as well as some empirical data on the impact of 
financial regulation and economic performance, I argue that this hybrid 
approach can prevent future rate-rigging without stifling growth.  I also 
contend that the recommendations of the Wheatley Review6 embody this 
hybrid approach by addressing some of the causes of the LIBOR scandal 
without completely abandoning the light-touch approach to economic 
regulation. 
This Note proceeds in seven parts.  Part II follows this introduction 
and presents a brief history of LIBOR and a discussion of its significance in 
the global marketplace. Part III explains the facts of the LIBOR rate-
rigging scandal.  Part IV reviews the British approach to financial 
regulation both before and after the LIBOR scandal.  This part also 
discusses how the traditional approach to banking regulation in the United 
Kingdom is changing in the face of the scandal.  Part V presents the U.S. 
 
REUTERS (June 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-barclays-libor-idUSBRE85 
Q0J720120627.  It is not clear whether Barclays is done paying for its sins as individual states continue 
to investigate.  See U.S. Investigates LIBOR Scandal, IRISH TIMES (July 16, 2012), http://www.irishtimes.com/ 
newspaper/breaking/2012/0716/ breaking9.html.  
4 See Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, FSA Reference No. 
121882 (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/rbs.pdf; Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice 
to UBS AG, FSA Reference No. 186958 (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/ 
ubs.pdf; In re The Royal Bank of Scot. PLC & RBS Japan Ltd., CFTC Docket 13-14 (Feb. 6, 2013); In 
re UBS AG & UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd, CFTC Docket 13-09 (Dec. 19, 2012). 
5 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities 
Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2009). 
6 See infra Part IV.B. 
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financial regulation framework and two of the agencies involved in the 
LIBOR scandal: the CFTC and the DOJ. 
Finally, Part VI uses the LIBOR scandal to highlight some of the 
relevant differences and similarities of the U.K. and U.S. approaches to 
banking regulation.  Ultimately, this Note suggests that a combination of 
the two approaches is best. It also considers an objection to this hybrid 
approach and uses some empirical data to evaluate the argument and the 
objection.  Finally, this Note argues that a hybrid position is largely 
embodied in the recommendations of the Wheatley Review because these 
recommendations provide for stronger oversight while not stifling 
economic growth.  Part VII concludes by providing a summary of this 
Note’s main argument. 
 
II.  THE HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF LIBOR 
 
LIBOR was created in the mid-1980s, when banks developed 
increasingly complex trading instruments that allowed them to participate 
in a variety of transactions.  Generally, these transactions involved trading 
currency futures with each other.7  While these investment vehicles were 
attractive, many of them relied on interest rate agreements that had to be 
ratified before a contract could be signed.8  The British Bankers 
Association (BBA) created LIBOR in 1984 as a response to this problem 
and as a means to standardize the rate-setting process.9 
At its inception, the BBA calculated LIBOR by averaging responses 
from participating banks to the question: “At what rate do you think 
interbank term deposits will be offered by one prime bank to another prime 
bank for a reasonable market size today at 11am?”10  In 1988, the BBA 
updated this question to ask: “At what rate could you borrow funds, were 
you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a 
reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”11 
Thompson Reuters, who calculates the rate on behalf of the BBA, 
performs the LIBOR calculation daily after participating banks submit their 
responses.12  The calculation ignores the highest and lowest quartiles of 
submissions and averages the remaining submissions.  The result is the 
 
7 British Bankers Ass’n, Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR.COM, http://bbalibor.com/bbalibor-
explained/historical-perspective (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 This change was driven by a consensus that the notion of a “prime bank” was no longer 
meaningful.  See id. 
12 Christopher Allessi, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 19, 
2012), http://www.cfr.org/uk/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729. 
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LIBOR rate for that day.13  At the time of the scandal, the BBA offered the 
LIBOR rate for ten different currencies with a variety of different 
hypothetical loan durations, varying from overnight to twelve months.14  
Thus, 150 different LIBOR rates are actually calculated each day.15 
Although originally created as a tool for interbank lending, LIBOR 
has been widely used as a financial benchmark.  According to the CFTC, 
use of LIBOR includes “U.S. based swaps transactions and futures 
contracts, as well as home mortgages and commercial and personal 
consumer loans.”16  The value of “Forward Rate Agreements” between 
banks, based on LIBOR, had a value exceeding $500 trillion by the end of 
2011.17  In other words, LIBOR has implications for wide ranging classes 
of borrowers “from Russian oil producers to homeowners in 
Detroit . . . . Fibbing by banks could mean that millions of borrowers 
around the world are paying artificially low rates on their loans.”18  It is no 
wonder that allegations of rate-fixing have gained such widespread 
attention. 
 
III.  THE STORY OF THE LIBOR RATE FIXING SCANDAL 
 
As mentioned in Part II, the BBA derives LIBOR from responses 
submitted by individual banks to a hypothetical question.  Since those 
responses were not linked to transactional data, they were not based on 
actual market conditions.19  This lack of connection to empirical trading 
data left LIBOR open to manipulation by those responsible for determining 
its value. 
Although Barclays is not the only bank guilty of LIBOR manipulation, 
it was the first bank to enter into a LIBOR-related settlement with the FSA 
and CFTC.20  Accordingly, the relevant authorities have laid out the facts of 
 
13 Id. 
14 British Bankers Ass’n, The Basics, BBALIBOR.COM, http://bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-
basics (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).  
15 Id. 
16 In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 2 (June 
27, 2012).  
17 Id.  A Forward Rate Agreement is a contract that sets the interest to be paid between parties for 
an obligation that has a future start date.  See Forward Rate Agreement, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fra.asp#axzz2L5ZftgoX (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).  
18 Carrick Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt On Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120831164167818299.html.  
19 HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: INITIAL DISCUSSION PAPER 12 (2012) 
[hereinafter THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION], available at https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191763/condoc_wheatley_review.pdf.  
20 The Barclays settlement was announced in June 2012, the RBS and UBS settlements followed 
several months later.  For a timeline of events surrounding the scandal, including when the settlements 
were announced, see Timeline: LIBOR-fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
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Barclays’s case more clearly and made those facts available for analysis 
longer than the facts surrounding manipulation at other banks.  This Note 
uses Barclays as a proxy to explain how and why various persons and 
institutions manipulated the LIBOR rate. 
On June 27, 2012, the FSA announced its settlement with Barclays.21  
In its findings, the FSA charged Barclays with inappropriate LIBOR 
submissions, alleging that Barclays’s LIBOR submissions were fraudulent 
for two reasons.  First, the FSA found that “Barclays acted inappropriately 
on numerous occasions between January 2005 and July 2008 by making 
US dollar submissions . . . that took into account requests made by its 
[own] interest rate derivatives traders.”22  Barclays’s LIBOR submissions 
also considered requests from derivatives traders from other banks.23  
Second, the FSA found that Barclays had manipulated LIBOR submissions 
by “taking into account concerns over the negative media perception of 
Barclays’s LIBOR submissions.”24  LIBOR submissions are supposed to be 
formed only as a response to the prompt question.  Consideration of either 
of these factors was therefore inappropriate because neither factor was 
directly related to the cost of borrowing money.25  The CFTC’s charges and 
findings in the United States echoed those of the FSA.26 
 
A.  Manipulations of LIBOR at the Request of Traders 
 
Barclays made its LIBOR submissions through its London Money 
Market Desk, where a small number of individuals were charged with 
submitting the bank’s daily LIBOR responses.27  At the time, the Money 
Market Desk was charged with “manag[ing] Barclays’s liquidity position 
and . . . ensur[ing] that Barclays [was] fully funded each day in all 
currencies . . . .”28  Both the FSA and CFTC found that Barclays did not 
have sufficient internal controls or monitoring in place to determine how 
these submitters should operate.29 
 
news/business-18671255.  
21 See Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1. 
22 Id. at 2.  For an analysis of the FSA finding, see infra Part III.A. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Id. 
26 In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 2–3 (June 
27, 2012). 
27 See id. at 7.  According to the CFTC, one Senior LIBOR submitter was primarily assisted by 
another, more junior money market trader.  Id. at 7.  It is not clear exactly how many Barclays 
employees were involved in the process of submitting LIBOR rates.  
28 See id. 
29 See id.  Noting that Barclays did not have any controls or procedures in place that detailed how 
LIBOR submissions should be determined or monitored.  See also Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 
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On many occasions, from at least the middle of 2005, traders with 
connections to the Barclays Money Market Desk would send requests that 
Barclays change their LIBOR submission that day.30  Traders would 
generally ask for either a direction for manipulation or a specific number 
the requestor hoped to see Barclays submit.31  Because of the way LIBOR 
was calculated, Barclays’s submission of a particular rate number had the 
potential to influence the official LIBOR rate for that day.  For example, a 
trader who held a position that would benefit from a lower LIBOR might 
ask the Barclays Money Market Desk to lower its submission that day so 
that the trader’s position benefited.  Some of the specific messages 
highlighted by the CFTC concerning the one month (1m) and three month 
(3m) LIBOR show how transparent these requests were: 
 
“Your annoying colleague again . . . Would love to get a high 1m 
Also if poss a low 3m . . . if poss . . . thanks” (February 3, 2006, 
Trader in London to Submitter). 
 
“Hi Guys, We got a big position in 3m libor for the next 3 days. 
Can we please keep the libor fixing at 5.39 for the next few days. 
It would really help. We do not want to fix any higher than that. 
Tks a lot.” (September 13, 2006, Senior Trader in New York to 
Submitter).32 
 
The record leaves no doubt that the submitters at the Money Market 
Desk responded to these requests.  Sometimes, Barclays’s LIBOR 
submitters would respond generally that they would “do [their] best.”33  
Other times, the submitters would specifically confirm that they had made 
a change in response to a request or would tell the trader exactly where 
they planned to set their LIBOR submission: 
 
 
1, at 3. 
30 See Christopher Allessi, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 19, 
2012), http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/ p28729. 
31 See In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 9 
(June 27, 2012). 
32 Id. at 9–10.  These communications occurred almost entirely over email or instant messaging 
programs, so the original message formatting is retained above in order to illustrate the lack of 
formalities in these messages.  They suggest an extremely close and informal relationship between 
traders benefitting from specific LIBOR rates and the Barclays employees in charge of setting those 
rates.  The FSA specifically noted “[t]he routine nature of requests demonstrates that the Derivatives 
Traders considered Barclays took their requests into account when determining its submissions.”  Final 
Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 12. 
33 In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 10 (June 
27, 2012). 
HALL_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:25 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  




“Am going 13, think the market will go 12-12 ½.”  (November 
14, 2005, Submitter’s response to a swaps trader request for a 
very high one-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR submission, preferably 
a submission of “13+”). 
 
“Done . . . for you big boy . . .” (April 7, 2006, Submitter’s 
response to swaps trader requests for low one-month and three-
month U.S. Dollar LIBOR).34 
 
In response to this acquiescence by Barclays’s LIBOR submitters, 
traders often expressed profound gratitude.35  The overall picture is one of a 
close working relationship between Barclays’s LIBOR submitters and the 
traders who stood to benefit one way or another by changes in LIBOR.  
Both the CFTC and the FSA found that this relationship led Barclays to 
submit LIBOR rates that impermissibly considered external factors and 
were not simply in response to the prompt question that the BBA used in 
defining LIBOR.36 
 
B.  Manipulation of LIBOR at the Request of Barclays’s 
Management 
 
Barclays derivative traders were not the only employees applying 
pressure on the bank’s LIBOR submitters.  Both the CFTC and FSA found 
that Barclays’s management pressured its LIBOR rate submitters to set 
rates based on public image as it related to the perceived link between its 
LIBOR rate-submissions and the bank’s financial health. 
During the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008, there was considerable 
worry about the health of individual banks and their ability to withstand the 
crisis.37  This fear affected Barclays’s LIBOR submissions in several ways.  
Barclays did not “want to report the high rates they [were] paying for short-
term loans because they [did not] want to tip off the market that they [were] 
desperate for cash.”38  Barclays’s managers apparently believed that an 
appearance of desperation could result from the way LIBOR is calculated.39 
A bank might appear desperate because the LIBOR rate it submits is 
supposed to represent the cost of currency to that bank, but because banks 
 
34 Id. 
35 For instance, one trader exclaimed, “Dude.  I owe you big time!  Come over one day after work 
and I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger.”  Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 19. 
36 Id. at 22; In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 
11 (June 27, 2012). 
37 Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 23. 
38 Mollenkamp, supra note 18. 
39 Id. 
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tend to charge struggling institutions a higher rate, a higher rate submission 
could be seen as a sign that the bank was struggling financially.  If the 
market believed that Barclays was paying more to borrow than other banks, 
the market might view that as a sign that Barclays was struggling to 
survive.  That perceived weakness would hurt Barclays’s ability to raise 
capital or otherwise be competitive in the marketplace.  Additionally, 
because of the financial crisis, lending between banks had come to a virtual 
standstill, leaving very few transactions to compare a bank’s quoted 
LIBOR rate and the rate they were actually paying to borrow money.40  In 
other words, due to the lack of real-world transactions, there was no way to 
verify the truthfulness of a bank’s statement on what borrowing money 
might cost them. 
Banks’ fears that their LIBOR submissions could be viewed as a sign 
of weakness had some basis in reality.  A September 2007 blog post on the 
influential business website Bloomberg.com pointed to a Barclays LIBOR 
submission—which was the highest on the U.S. dollar LIBOR panel—as a 
sign that Barclays might be having liquidity problems.41  It then asked, “So 
what the hell is happening at Barclays and its Barclays Capital securities 
unit that is prompting its peers to charge it premium interest rates in the 
money market?”42  This kind of media scrutiny makes banks’ fears more 
understandable.  Additionally, Barclays believed that banks were unfairly 
submitting numbers that were too low for market conditions and expressed 
their concerns to both the FSA and BBA.43 
Nevertheless, in an effort to avoid negative media attention, 
Barclays’s management gave specific instructions to the effect that 
Barclays “should not ‘stick its head above the parapet’ in terms of its 
LIBOR submissions.”44  In other words, Barclays did not want to risk being 
seen as financially weak by submitting LIBOR rates that might attract 
unwanted attention.  The FSA and CFTC each found that Barclays’s 
consideration of media reports and its public image were also 
impermissible under the definition of LIBOR.45 
The Barclays episode reveals three distinct problems.  First, because 
of the close relationship between LIBOR submitters and those who benefit 
from their submissions, there is a distinct “people problem” where personal 
relationships and personal gains incentivize manipulation.  Second, there is 
 
40 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19, at 10–15 (discussing generally the 
effects and problems of the lack of actual transactions and the “signaling effect” of LIBOR 
submissions); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 23. 
41 Mark Gilbert, Barclays Takes a Money-Market Beating, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2007, 4:21 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8uEKKBYY7As. 
42 Id. 
43 Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 25–27. 
44 Id. at 25. 
45 Id. at 29–31. 
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a corresponding “publicity problem” since the submitting institution has an 
incentive to manipulate its submissions to influence public perception of 
the institution’s health.  Finally, there is an identifiable “reality problem” 
that stems from the hypothetical nature of the LIBOR submission process.  
Because LIBOR has not been tied to real-world transactions, it lacked a 
means to verify the numbers that banks submit.  These three problems are 
revisited below as a means of analyzing the different approaches to banking 
regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
IV.  BANKING REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
This part discusses the structure and philosophy of financial regulation 
in the United Kingdom.  Subpart A presents the Financial Services 
Authority and its guiding policies articulated prior to the LIBOR scandal.  
After the LIBOR scandal became known, authorities in the U.K. created 
the Wheatley Review (Review) to examine LIBOR and suggest 
improvements.46  The Review represents a break from the guiding 
philosophy of the pre-LIBOR scandal era.  Subpart B presents the Review 
and the corresponding changes in financial regulation in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
A.  The Financial Services Authority 
 
The main financial regulator in the United Kingdom is the Financial 
Services Authority, “a one-stop regulatory shop for virtually all aspects of 
financial services in the United Kingdom.”47  Parliament created the FSA 
when it passed the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA).48  
Parliament enacted the FSMA in order to “provide for a single, statutory, 
financial service regulator . . . .”49  The FSA is thus the result of an 
intentional effort to simplify the United Kingdom’s regulatory structure. 
Banking supervision responsibilities were transferred from the Bank 
of England to the newly created FSA in the Bank of England Act 1998.50  
The Bank of England gained statutory authority to regulate banks in the 
 
46 See The Chancellor Has Commissioned Martin Wheatley to Undertake a Review of the 
Framework for the Setting of LIBOR, HM TREASURY (July 30, 2012), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 
wheatley_review.htm.  The Wheatley Review was named after Martin Wheatley, a former director of 
the FSA and the current head of the newly created Financial Conduct Authority. 
47 Margaret Cole, The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & 
Financial Law: “The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?” 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 267 
(2007) (Margaret Cole was the Director of Enforcement at the FSA from 2005 to 2012). 
48 Legal Framework, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/who/accountability/ 
legal/ index.shtml (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
49 Id. 
50 Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, §§ 21–30 (U.K.). 
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United Kingdom in 1979.51  Until then, the regulatory relationship between 
the government and banks had only been informal.52  Hesitancy to invoke 
statutory authority in regulating banks exemplifies the general approach of 
self-regulation that the United Kingdom has taken toward financial 
institutions. 
The FSA is operationally independent from the government of the 
United Kingdom.53  A Treasury-appointed board governs the FSA and this 
board is headed by an executive chairman.54  Perhaps most striking is the 
fact that the FSA is not funded by the government of the United Kingdom.  
Instead, it is “funded entirely by the firms [it] regulate[s].”55  Although it is 
operationally independent, the FSA reports to Parliament annually.56 
The FSMA provides four guiding principles to direct the FSA’s 
operation.57  The FSMA charges the FSA with: (1) maintaining confidence 
in the U.K. financial system;58 (2) contributing to the protection and 
enhancement of the stability of the U.K. financial system;59 (3) securing the 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers;60 and (4) reducing the 
extent to which it is possible for a business carried on . . . to be used for a 
purpose connected with financial crime.61 
In order to guide the firms it regulates, the FSA published a handbook 
which includes principles that “are a general statement of the fundamental 
obligations of firms under the regulatory system.”62  These general 
principles are the standard by which the FSA measures financial firms in 
the United Kingdom.  Violation of the principles exposes a firm to 
 
51 See Marianne Ojo, The Financial Services Authority: A Model of Improved Accountability?, 
MPRA PAPER, No. 580 (Nov. 7, 2005), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/ 580/1/MPRA_paper_580.pdf. 
52 See id. 
53 Who Are We?, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).  
54 The Board, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who/board (last visited Nov. 18, 
2012); Management Structure, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/ who/management (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
55 Who Are We?, supra note 53.  Although striking, the potential conflict of interest is outside the 
scope of this paper.  The funding structure of the FSA can be compared with the structure of the BBA, 
LIBOR’s parent organization.  The BBA is “the leading trade association for the [U.K.] banking and 
financial services sector.”  See About Us, BRITISH BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.bba.org.uk/about-us 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012).  
56 Cole, supra note 47, at 268.  
57 Id. 
58 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 3 (U.K.). 
59 Financial Services Act, 2010, c. 28, § 1 (U.K.) (amending the Financial Services and Markets 
Act of 2000 to include financial stability as an objective).  See also Statutory Objectives, FIN. SERV. 
AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/aims/statutory (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
60 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 5 (U.K.). 
61 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 6 (U.K.). 
62 FIN. SERV. AUTH., FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK princ. 1.1.2 (2013), 
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/PRIN/1/1. 
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disciplinary sanctions.63  It was these “Principles of Businesses” that 
Barclays violated in the LIBOR scandal, specifically Principles Two, 
Three, and Five.64  The FSA has been an advocate for this principles-based 
approach towards regulation where “the focus is on the outcomes rather 
than on the prescription of detailed rules.”65 
As a matter of policy, the guiding principle behind the FSA’s 
enforcement branch prior to the LIBOR scandal has been a light-touch 
approach to regulation.  Regulators using the light-touch approach 
“do not engage in aggressive regulation, preferring [instead] to intervene 
only when necessary,[] and only in limited ways.”66  Light-touch aims at a 
cooperative relationship with regulated entities, in part, to overcome the 
inevitable information disadvantage that regulators face as they try to 
monitor and control their constituents.67 
Margaret Cole, the Director of the Enforcement Division of the FSA 
from 2005 to 2012, characterized the light-touch approach as one where 
“the FSA is not an enforcement-led regulator at all, but one that uses 
supervision and ongoing relationships with the firms [it regulates] as its 
front-line means of regulation.”68  Cole described the relationship between 
the FSA and the firms it regulates as one where the FSA “create[s] 
incentives for firms to focus on compliance in return for a regulatory 
dividend, and that [dividend is] less regulatory intervention.”69  The light-
touch approach views regulatory intervention as something of a last resort, 
which should only be used after all market-based solutions have failed.70 
The main benefit of the light-touch approach is a greater attraction of 
business capital to the United Kingdom.71  At least one financial 
 
63 Id. princ. 1.1.7. 
64 Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 2.  Principle Two states, “A firm must conduct its 
business with due skill, care[,] and diligence;” Principle Three states, “A firm must take reasonable care 
to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems;” 
and Principle Five states, “A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct.”  FIN. SERV. 
AUTH., FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, princ. 2.1.1 (2013), http://fshandbook.info/FS/ 
html/FCA/PRIN/2/1.  
65 Cole, supra note 47, at 270. 
66 Banking Regulation, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/ 
Banking+regulation.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
67 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities 
Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2009). 
68 Cole, supra note 47, at 267. 
69 Id. at 271. 
70 Id. at 269. 
71 See Banking Regulation, supra note 66; Myles Neligan, UK’s FSA to Propose Overhaul of 
Global Bank Regulation, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/17/fsa-
idUSLH94367220090317 (“Legal experts warn any tightening of the FSA regime could trigger an 
exodus of leading banks away from the City of London unless it forms part of a coordinated 
international clampdown.”).  
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commentator has called the FSA an asset that the London market has in 
contrast to other major markets with more invasive regulators.72  Former 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Ed Balls, provided the following 
summary: 
 
The Government’s interest in this area is specific and clear: to 
safeguard the light touch and proportionate regulatory regime 
that has made London a magnet for international business. . . . 
[New] legislation will confer a new and specific power on the 
FSA to veto rule changes proposed by exchanges that would be 
disproportionate in their impact on the pivotal economic role that 
exchanges play in the UK and EU economies.73 
 
Prior to the LIBOR scandal, FSA officials proudly touted their light-
touch approach to economic regulation.  One can easily imagine how this 
focus on a light-touch approach set the stage for the LIBOR scandal.  
Banks like Barclays and their individual employees, constrained only by 
general principles, may have felt too much freedom or at least may have 
believed that they could get away with their manipulative practices.  By 
itself, the light-touch approach makes for an interesting comparison to the 
approach taken by the United States because it represents a clear contrast to 
U.S. financial regulations.  However, the United Kingdom’s reaction to the 
LIBOR scandal, contained in the recommendations of the “Wheatley 
Review,” alters any assessment of U.K. banking regulation because these 
recommendations are more restrictive than the light-touch approach. 
 
B.  The Wheatley Review 
 
As the LIBOR rate manipulation scandal became public, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer74 commissioned a review to investigate and 
report on the necessity of reforms to LIBOR.  The review would consider 
the adequacy of sanctions in the face of LIBOR manipulation, and the 
implications of LIBOR manipulation for other similar financial 
benchmarks.75  The Review was named after Martin Wheatley, the man 
appointed to head it.76  When he was appointed, Wheatley was the 
 
72 Damian Reece, London Confirms Its Reputation as the Capital City, Business Comment, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/2947958/Business-comment.html. 
73 Ed Balls MP, Econ. Sec’y to the Treasury, Financial Services: A U.K. Perspective, Speech at the 
Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce and the British Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 13, 2006), available 
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2277.htm. 
74 The Chancellor of Exchequer is the head of the treasury in the U.K.  See HM Treasury, GOV.UK, 
http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/about (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
75 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19, at 3. 
76 Press Release, The Rt Hon. George Osbourne MP, HM Treasury, The Wheatley Review (July 30, 
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managing director of the FSA, as well as the chief-executive designate of 
the newly-created Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).77  The Review 
published an initial discussion paper in August 2012,78 which was followed 
by a period in which affected parties could submit responses.  A final 
report, which included the Review’s recommendations, was published in 
September 2012.79  This subsection explains the recommendations of the 
Review that have been adopted by the U.K. 
Many findings of the Review mirror the findings of the FSA and 
CFTC in their cases against Barclays.  The Review found that “[b]anks and 
individuals working for banks have an incentive to attempt to manipulate 
the submissions . . . either to signal their perceived institutional 
creditworthiness or to support trading positions.”80  The Review also found 
that the decline in inter-bank lending had forced LIBOR submissions to 
rely increasingly “on expert judgment rather than transaction data.”81  In 
other words, the Review identified the people problem, publicity problem, 
and reality problem described in Part III. 
In its initial paper, the Review identified several key weaknesses in 
the then-current U.K. regulatory model as it related to LIBOR.  Those 
weaknesses included the opportunity for manipulation, the lack of 
independence and oversight, and the potential lack of sanctions to deter 
individual actors.82  After a period for comment on its initial paper, the 
Review presented its final report.  The final report made a number of 
specific recommendations to address the problems identified with LIBOR.  
First, the report recommended that authorities “introduce statutory 
regulation of administration of, and submission to, LIBOR.”83  The Review 
argued that this change would allow the FSA to more directly regulate 
LIBOR submissions by giving the FSA power it had previously lacked.84 
The Review also advocated for the creation of new criminal offenses 
under the FSMA.85  Previously, the FSMA did not empower the FSA to 
 
2012), available at http://hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review.htm. 
77 Id.  The Financial Conduct Authority was created in June 2012 as one of two new agencies to 
replace the FSA.  The FCA became active in April 2013.  It is “responsible for regulation of conduct in 
retail, as well as wholesale, financial markets, and the infrastructure that supports those markets.”  
Regulatory Reform—Background, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg_reform/ 
background (last updated Feb. 2, 2012). 
78 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19. 
79 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT (2012), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_li
bor_finalreport_280912.pdf [hereinafter THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT]. 
80 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19, at 3. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 9. 
83 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 11. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 18. 
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pursue criminal charges against individuals for attempting to manipulate 
LIBOR.86  Specifically, the Review suggested “[amending the] FSMA to 
include, as an offence, the making of a false or misleading statement in 
order to manipulate LIBOR.”87 While acknowledging the United 
Kingdom’s general aversion to proliferating criminal sanctions, the Review 
argued that civil penalties may not “be sufficient to prevent such behaviour 
in all cases.”88 
The Review also recommended that the administration of LIBOR be 
removed from the BBA and moved into a new institution that would be 
distinct from the submitting banks in a way the BBA, whose mission is to 
be an advocate for the banks, could not be.89  However, the Review 
remained committed to the idea “that market participants should continue 
to play a significant role in the production and oversight of LIBOR.”90 
Finally, the Review made several recommendations to alter the 
mechanics of calculating LIBOR.91  In order to counter the concern that 
LIBOR submissions are not adequately connected to market conditions, the 
Review recommended that submitting banks “explicitly and transparently” 
use actual transaction data to corroborate their rate submissions.92 The 
Review also recommended a delay of three months before publishing any 
individual bank’s LIBOR submission.93  This change was suggested to 
counter the creditworthiness-signaling concern.94 
The Review’s final report represents solutions to the three problems 
identified in Part III, as well as a move away from the light-touch approach 
to financial regulation.  The reality problem is solved by tying LIBOR 
submissions to actual transactions, so that the veracity of a bank’s 
submission can be confirmed.  The publicity problem is solved, or at least 




88 Id.  
89 Id. at 21–22. 
90 Id. at 7. 
91 In July 2013, NYSE Euronext purchased LIBOR from the BBA.  Although this sale eliminates the 
BBA’s participation in LIBOR, it is unclear how the sale will change the regulation surrounding the rate as 
it will still be under the jurisdiction of the U.K.’s financial regulators.  See Phillipa Leighton-Jones, Sold for 
£1 NYSE Euronext Takes Over Libor, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT BLOG (Jul. 9, 2013 8:05 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/09/libor-sold-to-nyse-euronext-how-did-we-get-here/?KEYWORDS 
=libor+scandal; Max Colchester, Is Libor Now Beyond Manipulation?, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT BLOG, 
(Jul. 9, 2013 12:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/09/is-libor-now-beyond-manipulation/ 
?mod=wsj_nview_latest.  
92 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 27.  The Review also made 
suggestions concerning which actual transactions submitting banks should look to corroborate their 
LIBOR submissions, particularly during periods of low market activity.   
93 Id. at 38. 
94 Id.  
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While it is conceivable that the media or analysts will still speculate on a 
bank’s financial health based on these delayed publications, the value of 
three-month-old data is questionable. 
The Review’s solution to the people problem—proposing new 
criminal sanctions—is particularly important.  The Review acknowledged 
the traditional hesitancy of creating new sanctions, but came to the 
conclusion that some new sanctions were needed to solve this problem.  
This appears to be a move away from the principles-based approach of 
light-touch, a conclusion confirmed by the FSA’s suggestion that their 
regulatory power be increased and the administration of LIBOR be moved 
from the BBA. 
Yet, the Review’s suggestions are not a total break from the light-
touch approach.  The Review tempered its call for new powers and criminal 
sanctions by declining to call for government administration of LIBOR and 
by reaffirming its commitment to the involvement of banks in the LIBOR 
regulatory process.  Even though it appears that the principles-based 
approach that characterizes light-touch regulation has receded some in the 
Review’s final report, the cooperative relationship with firms remains 
prominent.  For instance, although the Review suggests the development of 
“clear principles” for global financial benchmarks such as LIBOR, the 
Review also calls for the power to compel banks to participate in the 
LIBOR rate-setting process.95  In other words, as the light-touch approach 
would suggest, the Review remains committed to banks being involved in 
the LIBOR process while at the same time calling for the power to compel 
bank involvement if necessary, a regulatory power that appears to allow for 
greater intervention than characterized in the light-touch approach.  What 
remains after the Review’s recommendations is a more nuanced approach 
to financial regulation that balances regulatory power and bank 
involvement in how the government regulates them. 
 
C.  Responses to the Wheatley Review 
 
The U.K. government responded to the Wheatley Review with a full-
throated endorsement of its recommendations.96  The Treasury announced 
it would amend the Financial Services Bill to bring LIBOR submissions 
under statutory authority and expand criminal sanctions to cover attempts 
to manipulate LIBOR.97  The Treasury also agreed with the Review’s 
recommendation that the administration of LIBOR be moved from the 
 
95 Id. at 8–9.  
96 See Written Ministerial Statement, HM Treasury, Wheatley Review of LIBOR (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_ 
fst_171012.pdf. 
97 Id. at 2. 
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BBA to a successor still to be determined.98 
Public reception to the Review was mixed.  Some sources suggested 
that the changes meant nothing less than “the death of LIBOR.”99  Others 
believed that the Review was “a welcome step” and that stripping the BBA 
of its role in administering LIBOR was appropriate.100  The BBA indicated 
that it would support moving LIBOR’s administration to a new body.101 
The government’s embrace of the Review’s recommendations 
strengthens the conclusion that the light-touch approach to financial 
regulation in the United Kingdom has come to an end.  When coupled with 
similar regulatory changes made as a result of the sub-prime lending crisis, 
this conclusion seems inescapable.102  Although firms will remain involved 
in the administration of LIBOR,103 the expansion of procedures and 
regulations LIBOR-submitting banks now face is unprecedented in the 
United Kingdom.  Indeed, LIBOR-submitting banks and their individual 
employees may even face criminal sanctions if they manipulate LIBOR in 
the future.104  Perhaps more telling of the future of financial regulation in 
the United Kingdom is the total absence in the Treasury’s comments of a 
commitment to involvement of affected firms in the regulatory process.105 
 
V.  BANK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
This part outlines some of the financial regulatory structure in the 
United States.  It is necessarily a sketch because of the complexity involved 
in the overlapping state and federal regulatory schemes present in the 
United States.  According to one account, the financial sector in the United 
States has as many as 115 regulatory agencies operating at various levels of 
government.106  Given the proliferation of regulatory agencies, it is no 
surprise that banks face a daunting array of regulators: 
 
 
98 Id.  
99 Andrew Marder, The Death of Libor, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.fool.com/ 
investing/general/2012/09/27/the-death-of-libor.aspx (“I think that if enough are found with blood on 
their hands, we could be looking at the beginning of the end for the post 1980s bank.”). 
100 Wheatley Review: City Reaction, WALL ST. J. THE SOURCE BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2012/09/28/wheatley-review-city-reaction/. 
101 BBA Statement on Conclusions of Wheatley Review into LIBOR, BBA (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/bba-statement-on-conclusions-of-wheatley-review-into-libor. 
102 Huw Jones, New UK Watchdog Warns Banks “Light Touch” Era is Over, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/22/britain-banks-regulation-idUSL5E8LM8ZI20121022.  
103 See Written Ministerial Statement, supra note 96, at 3. 
104 See id. at 1 (endorsing the creation of new criminal sanctions for future rate manipulation). 
105 Id.  This absence is particularly noticeable compared to the Review’s comments on firm 
involvement. 
106 Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining: Regulatory Reform After the “Credit Crunch,” 15 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 314, 323 (2010). 
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A firm that is engaged in banking, securities, and insurance 
business, or offering products that overlap within these categories 
(e.g. certain types of annuities) may find itself being supervised 
by the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities 
and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC), the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), together with relevant banking, securities 
and insurance regulators at the state level.107 
 
In addition to this multitude of agencies, the history of banking 
regulation is rather chaotic as well.  Banking regulation in the United States 
“represents a set of accumulated responses to a long history of financial 
crises, scandals, happenstance, personalities[,] and compromises among a 
broad and competing array of industry and governmental units.”108  This 
Note focuses on two of the federal regulatory agencies relevant to the 
LIBOR scandal: the CFTC and the DOJ.109 
 
A.  The Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
 
As Part II described, the CFTC fined Barclays significantly for 
violating sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act 
(CEA).110  One of the purposes of the CEA was to “ensure fair practice and 
honest dealings on commodity exchanges, for the protection of the market 
itself as well as those who could be injured by unreasonable fluctuations in 
commodity prices.”111  As the CFTC summarized the relevant sections of 
the CEA, “Together, Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a(2) of the Act prohibit acts 
of attempted manipulation.”112 
 
107 Id. at 324. 
108 Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 
(Apr. 2000).  
109 That is not to suggest that banks do not face liability on a state level; they likely do.  See, e.g., US 
Investigates LIBOR Scandal, IRISH TIMES (Jul. 16, 2012), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/ 
2012/0716/breaking9.html (explaining the role of the New York and Connecticut attorneys general in 
investigating LIBOR manipulation); Darrell Preston, Rigged Libor Hits States-Localities With $6 Billion: 
Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/rigged-libor-hits-
states-localities-with-6-billion-muni-credit.html.  
110 In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 1 (June 
27, 2012); 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13(a)(2), 13b (2012).  
111 Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984). 
112 In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 26 (June 
HALL_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:25 PM 
 Anything for You Big Boy 
 34:153 (2013) 
171 
 
The creation of the CFTC was a Congressional response to increased 
participation in the futures market as “the shift to a market-oriented 
economy . . . caused merchandisers and processors to make greater use of 
the futures markets to hedge their risks against substantial price rises.”113  
The CFTC is responsible for “assur[ing] the economic utility of the futures 
markets by encouraging their competitiveness and efficiency, protecting 
market participants against fraud, manipulation, and abusive trading 
practices, and by ensuring the financial integrity of the clearing process.”114 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Bill and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank) greatly expanded the historically meager enforcement 
powers of the CFTC.115  They now rival the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s enforcement powers.116  This increased enforcement 
authority has led to an increase in enforcement actions: from 2010 to 2011, 
CFTC enforcement actions increased 74% and included seventy criminal 
convictions and indictments.117  The scope of these actions range from fines 
levied against international banks like Barclays, UBS, and RBS for 
millions of dollars to fines against individuals for several hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.118  This sort of prosecutorial activity is in stark 
contrast to conditions described above in the United Kingdom, where 
regulators are only now getting the power to criminally prosecute 
manipulators. 
As a matter of policy, the CFTC’s mission of public protection drives 
the agency.119  The Chairman of the CFTC, Gary Gensler, has articulated 
 
27, 2012). 
113 Graham Purcell & Abelardo Lopez Valdez, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 
1974: Regulatory Legislation for Commodity Futures Trading in a Market-Oriented Economy, 21 S.D. 
L. REV. 555, 555–56 (1976).  
114 Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/ 
About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
115 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (relevant portions codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)). 
116 See Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/ 
LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); Tyler Layne, The New CFTC 
Enforcement Rules: A Step in the Right Direction?, Comment to C.F.T.C. Is Set to Get Tougher on 
Fraud, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-
entry/new-cftc-enforcement-rules-step-right-direction-01-05-2011. 
117 Joshua Horn, Expect More Investigations and Enforcement Actions from CFTC, WESTLAW NEWS 
& INSIGHT BLOG (Oct. 25, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/Insight/2011/10_-
_October/Expect_more_investigations_and_enforcement_ actions_from_CFTC/.  
118 See Enforcement Press Releases, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/EnforcementPressReleases/index.htm (last accessed 
Feb. 16, 2003).  
119 Gary Gensler, Chairman of Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Address before the 
George Washington University Center for Law, Economics, and Finance Conference: The New Era of 
Swaps Market Reform (Oct. 10, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-124). 
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priorities of transparency, separation of consumer investment funds from 
operational funds, and a preference for benchmark interest rates like 
LIBOR to be tied to real-world transactions.120  However, despite its 
mission and policy preferences, the CFTC’s jurisdiction is limited to the 
futures market.  Given this limited jurisdiction, it makes sense to turn to the 
DOJ, a government agency with broader enforcement powers that has also 
been involved in the LIBOR scandal. 
 
B.  The Department of Justice 
 
In June 2012, the Fraud Section of the DOJ announced a settlement 
agreement with Barclays where the Fraud Section agreed to forgo further 
prosecution in exchange for a significant fine and Barclays’s cooperation 
with the Fraud Section’s investigations.121  As this section explains, the 
presence of the Fraud Section and its powers of criminal enforcement 
suggest that the “people problem” discussed in Part III may not be as 
prevalent in the United States, at least insofar as the “people problem” is 
associated with a lack of criminal enforcement.122 
The Fraud Section is the DOJ’s “front-line litigating unit that acts as a 
rapid response team, investigating and prosecuting complex white collar 
crime cases throughout the country.”123  The Fraud Section is a sub-agency 
of the DOJ, and is guided by its mission to enforce the law and control 
crime.124 
As it applies to corporate crimes, principles promulgated by the 
Attorney General, the federal government’s chief law-enforcement official, 
guide the Fraud Section.125  These general principles provide guidance for 
 
120 Id. (expressing support for the “clearinghouse” protections stemming from Dodd-Frank whereby 
firms are prevented from “using the collateral attributable to cleared swaps customers who haven’t 
defaulted to cover losses of defaulting customers”). 
121 Letter from Denis McInerney, Chief, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Steven R. Peiken, David H. Braff, Jeffrey T. Scott & Matthew S. Fitzwater, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 
Re: Barclay’s Bank PLC (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/33720 
1271017335469822.pdf. 
122 In cases analogous to the LIBOR scandal where the parties involved are international entities 
subject to both U.K. and U.S. regulation, the distinction between the two systems should not be of much 
practical difference because they overlap.  Of course, it is not clear that the threat of criminal sanctions 
would be an effective deterrent to some individuals.  See, e.g., David Enrich, Rate-Rig Spotlight Falls 
on ‘Rain Man,’ WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887 
324445904578285810706107442.html?KEYWORDS=Department+of+Justice+Libor. 
123 Fraud Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ (last visited Nov. 
20, 2012).  
124 About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last updated Mar. 
2012). 
125 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. on Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Corporations to Heads of Dep’ts Components, U.S. Att’ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
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both federal prosecutors and corporate leaders, with the goal of better 
securing “public confidence in business entities.”126  The principles also 
provide a list of factors to consider in determining whether to prosecute a 
crime.127 
These general principles give federal prosecutors room to settle with 
corporations as the Fraud Division did with Barclays.  But, the DOJ also 
touts the success of federal prosecutors in “root[ing] out corruption in 
financial markets and corporate board rooms across the country.”128  
However, rather than boasting a conviction rate or incarceration rate of 
criminals, the DOJ suggests that “[t]he most significant result of this 
enforcement initiative is that corporations increasingly recognize the need 
for self-policing, self-reporting, and cooperation with law enforcement.”129  
The fact that the DOJ chooses to emphasize the need for self-policing in the 
business community along with the success of federal prosecutors 
demonstrates a balance within the DOJ of aggressively pursuing criminal 
conduct and encouraging firms to self-police. 
There are limits to the DOJ’s talk of “principles.”  It might be 
tempting to see the DOJ’s use of “principles” terminology as an analog to 
the light-touch approach to regulation in the United Kingdom.  However, 
even though this approach has led to more self-policing by firms, that 
change must be viewed in light of the DOJ’s aggressive efforts to root out 
corruption.  Coupled with the CFTC’s recent prosecutorial efforts 
discussed above, financial regulation in the United States clearly has 
greater sanctions for individuals than in the United Kingdom. 
In the face of the United States’ complex financial regulatory scheme, 
it is difficult to synthesize conclusions or policies guiding regulation.  
However, three points are clear.  First, in the United States there is, as the 
proliferation of agencies demonstrates, an underlying tendency towards 
intensive regulation.  The broadening of CFTC enforcement powers under 
Dodd-Frank in response to the recent financial crisis also affirms this 
tendency. 
Second, in the federal system, there is a robust role for criminal 
prosecutions.  Not only did Barclays pay steep fines to the CFTC, it also 
paid a fine to the DOJ.  There is also reason to think that there may be 
criminal charges levied against other banks as a result of ongoing 
investigation into the LIBOR scandal.130  Additionally, the DOJ has 
 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
126 Id. at 1. 
127 These factors include the seriousness of the crime, the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the 
corporation, the adequacy of prosecution of individual wrongdoers within the corporation, and the 
adequacy of civil or regulatory remedies.  Id. at 4. 
128 Id. at 1. 
129 Id. 
130 See Letter from Denis McInerney, supra note 121.  For further suggestion that the DOJ will 
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recently taken steps to bolster the Fraud Section, which will increase its 
ability to prosecute fraud.131 
Finally, the proliferation of agencies and the varied enforcement 
messages each agency might send toward affected firms suggests that 
compliance with the regulatory scheme is more difficult than it needs to be.  
While any individual agency might adopt a more lenient approach, banks 
still face a maze of administrative and criminal regulations. 
 
VI.  COMPARING THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM IN LIGHT OF THE LIBOR SCANDAL 
 
Parts IV and V briefly explained the structure and philosophy of bank 
regulators in the United Kingdom and United States.  Part VI compares the 
regulatory structures of the United States and United Kingdom.  Part VI 
also uses the three LIBOR-scandal problems (people, reality, and publicity) 
identified above to examine the regulatory structure of both the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  Additionally, Part VI examines the 
question of which model ought to be favored more fully. 
 
A.  Towards a Hybrid Approach 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Review marks the end of the light-touch 
era of financial regulation.  The government’s adoption of the Review’s 
recommendations appears to have significantly increased the agency-based 
oversight as well as the criminal sanctions involved in setting future 
LIBOR.  In other words, it represents a move towards the U.S. model 
characterized by more invasive regulation and sanctions.  However, in 
comparison to the plethora of state and federal agencies and government 
entities regulating a financial firm in the United States,132 the Review 
seems to be only a small step toward the U.S. model. 
It might seem as though the United States has an advantage in solving 
the people problem when it comes to criminal sanctions, at least if the 
prosecution of offenders is taken as a measure of success.  This conclusion 
must be tempered by the fact that, thus far, Barclays received essentially 
the same kind of penalty in the United States and the United Kingdom.  As 
of this writing, only a single individual has been targeted for criminal 
 
continue pursuing criminal sanctions, see David Henrich, Evan Perez, & Dana Cimilluca, U.S. Wants 
Criminal Charges for RBS, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2013, 7:39 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000 
1424127887323644904578270070760266356.html?mod=WSJ_qtoverview_wsjlatest. 
131 Joe Palazzolo, DOJ Strengthening Its Fraud Section, Wiretap Unit, Corruption Currents, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/11/04/doj-strengthening 
-its-fraud-section-wiretap-unit/. 
132 Which, as discussed supra in Part V, the CFTC and DOJ are only a small sample.  
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sanctions in the United States in connection with the LIBOR scandal.133  
Regardless of this fact, it remains true, as discussion of the DOJ and CFTC 
above shows, that the financial regulatory apparatus in the United States 
offers a greater threat of criminal sanctions. 
Overall, determining which model works better is a matter of priorities 
and values.  If the light-touch approach was in fact a “regulatory 
dividend”134 for banks that drove them to do business in London, then the 
economic impact of increased regulation might encourage banks to move 
their business elsewhere. 
Yet, this reasoning also suggests that the United Kingdom retains the 
upper hand in direct comparison to the United States.  Even after 
implementing the Review’s recommendations, the United Kingdom 
remains less regulated than the United States.  As confirmation, one 
financial commentator has suggested that Dodd-Frank’s tougher rules are 
leading some international banks to reconsider their contracts with banks in 
the United States.135  If so, then it stands to reason that when a bank has a 
choice between the United Kingdom and the United States, it will prefer 
the milder regulatory structure of the United Kingdom, even after the 
Review’s recommendations have been enacted. 
On the other hand, it may have been the permissive stance toward 
regulation in the light-touch era that gave rise to the LIBOR manipulations 
in the first place.  If the goal of financial regulation is to avoid this sort of 
manipulation, then one might reasonably favor the more rigorous 
regulatory scheme of the United States over the United Kingdom.  After 
all, the LIBOR scandal is not the only scandal currently facing the United 
Kingdom’s banks.136  For instance, the light-touch approach has also been 
linked to recent allegations against U.K. banks of illicitly processing 
Iranian financial transactions and accepting deposits from money 
launderers.137  A more robust regulatory scheme might have prevented 
 
133 See Enrich, supra note 122.  Only three individuals have currently been charged in the U.K.  See 
Kristin Ridley & Tommy Wilkes, Judge Sets October As Showtime in UK Libor Hearings, REUTERS 
(July 30, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-britain-libor-idUSBRE96T0Z 
A20130730. 
134 Cole, supra note 47. 
135 Luke Jeffs & Nia Williams, Dodd-Frank forces European Banks to Review U.S. Deals, 
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/26/us-europe-derivatives-doddfrank-
idUSBRE89P0UZ20121026.  For example, the CFTC identified 38 areas in the swaps market that it 
would write rules on in light of Dodd-Frank.  See Rulemaking Areas, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/index.htm (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2013).  
136 London-based bank HSBC was recently charged with being a “conduit” for illicit money 
laundering by a number of nefarious groups including terrorist organizations, Mexican drug cartels, and 
the Iranian government.  See HSBC Money Laundering Report: Key Findings, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 
2012, 5:31 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18880269. 
137 Deborah Hargreaves, Why UK Banks Deserve to Sweat Under the Scrutiny of US Regulators, 
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some of this malfeasance. 
A better path lies somewhere in the middle of the two positions 
occupied by the United States and the United Kingdom.  It seems clear that 
the era of light-touch regulation gave rise to conditions that allowed 
fraudulent manipulation of LIBOR to flourish.  Without fear of regulators 
or criminal sanctions, bankers in London were able to act in less than 
ethical ways without fear of reprisal.  However, it is difficult to defend the 
regulatory excesses of the U.S. system.  Such invasive oversight, after all, 
failed to prevent the sub-prime mortgage crisis or the wave of high profile 
“Ponzi schemes” in recent years.138 
An ideal solution would meet in the middle by strengthening the 
regulatory structure in the United Kingdom while simplifying the 
regulatory scheme in the United States.  The recommendations of the 
Review can be viewed as embodying this kind of hybrid approach since 
they strengthen the regulatory powers of the government without losing 
sight of the important role that financial firms can play.  By adequately 
striking this balance, future manipulation may be prevented without risking 
the alienation of firms. 
 
B.  Some Objections Considered 
 
One practical objection to this compromise solution is that it is too 
difficult to accomplish in reality.  In response to crises like the LIBOR 
scandal, one tactic for regulators or lawmakers is to simply insist on 
passing new laws or enacting new regulation without critically evaluating 
their impact.  Luca Enriques, former Commissioner of the Italian 
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB),139 captures 
the rationale behind this “knee-jerk” reaction well: 
 
 [A]s conventional wisdom has it, if there is a crisis, then 
regulators must have previously failed to do their job by omitting 
to take action, whether regulatory or supervisory, that could have 
 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2012, 12:51 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/10/uk-banks-
sweating-under-scrutiny-us-regulators.  
138 Unfortunately, examples of recent Ponzi schemes are easy to come by.  For a timeline of Bernard 
Madoff’s scheme, see Bernard L. Madoff, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/reference/timestopics/people/m/bernard_l_madoff/index.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).  For a 
description of a particularly modern Ponzi scheme involving the electronic currency bitcoin, see Kevin 
Roose, Shockingly Something Called The ‘Bitcoin Savings And Trust’ Was A Ponzi Scheme, The Daily 
Intelligencer, N.Y. MAG. (Jul. 23, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/07/was-
a-ponzi-scheme.html.  
139 The CONSOB is the chief Italian securities regulator.  See Consob: What It Is and What It Does, 
CONSOB, http://www.consob.it/mainen/consob/what/what.html?symblink=/mainen/consob/what/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2013). 
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prevented it.  Thus, further inaction, however justified in theory, 
is intolerable . . . a diffused sense of urgency implies that 
everyone is expected to do his or her part to avert the meltdown, 
and it would be embarrassing for any institution to confess that 
there is nothing it can do to help . . . .140 
 
According to Enriques, political realties force regulators and 
lawmakers to act in the face of a crisis, even if they were not to blame for 
the underlying crisis.141  This is true, he argues, even if empirical data 
suggests a change in laws or regulation will not solve the underlying 
problems that precipitated the crisis in question.142  His somewhat cynical 
conclusion is that the best approach for regulators in the wake of crises is 
“maintaining pretense of doing something while actually innovating very 
little . . . .”143  Essentially, Enriques argues that the kinds of regulations and 
laws that crises generate are not very effective, so those lawmakers and 
regulators who earnestly desire well-functioning markets should leave the 
markets alone during times of crisis, even if they need to put on a political 
show to satisfy the public. 
Author David John of the Heritage Foundation makes a similar 
argument.  He argues that in response to the LIBOR crisis, no new laws are 
necessary, but financial regulators should simply enforce already existing 
laws and regulations.144  In explaining the LIBOR scandal, John blames 
delay on the part of some regulators to act when they first learned of the 
potential LIBOR manipulation.145  John points to the fact that Barclays and 
other banks that manipulated LIBOR will pay large fines as proof that 
existing laws are adequate.146  Implicit in John’s argument is the idea that 
regulatory reform either cannot or should not attempt to prevent 
manipulation if post-hoc remedies are capable of punishing those 
responsible.  In short, John argues that current laws, if adequately enforced, 
are sufficient.147 
 
140 Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of 
Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1148 (2009).  
Although Enriques is responding to the sub-prime credit crisis at the end of the last decade, his 
reasoning can easily extend to the sort of crisis of confidence that the LIBOR scandal represents. 
141 Id. at 1148–49. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1147. 
144 David C. John, LIBOR Rigging Scandal: No New Laws Necessary, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/libor-rigging-scandal-no-new-laws-
necessary.  
145 Id.  In particular, John points to the failure of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to act when 
he learned of the potential manipulation by Barclays as early as April 2008.  
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
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C.  Does Financial Regulation Really Stifle Growth or Prevent 
Crises? 
 
Enriques and John are both suspicious of the idea of passing new laws 
in response to a financial scandal.  Although the hybrid approach advocated 
for above would not always call for passing new laws, the objection is 
worth considering.  In evaluating the objection, it would be helpful to 
examine empirical evidence.  However, there is a lack of decisive empirical 
evidence that would indicate when regulation prevents a crisis or when too 
much regulation stifles economic growth.148  According to one group of 
scholars from the Central Bank of Chile: “[T]here appears to be a universal 
belief among those who have studied these issues that inappropriate 
regulations and supervisory standards in a country not only retard its long-
run economic growth but also increase the likelihood of financial crisis that 
could spread beyond the country’s own borders.”149 
Yet, despite this widespread belief that over-regulation can stifle 
growth and hasten crises, it is not clear that empirical data supports it.  In 
their study, the Central Bank of Chile scholars gathered information from 
45 countries and came to several conclusions.150  First, weaker central 
governments tend to impose harsher restrictions on banking activities.151  
Second, countries with more restrictive systems of regulation do not 
necessarily have poorer functioning banking systems.152  Finally, countries 
with more restrictive regulatory systems have a greater probability of 
suffering a banking crisis.153 
The second and third conclusions of their study are striking, especially 
in the context of proposing a direction for financial regulatory reform.  The 
empirical evidence seems to contradict the notion that a stricter regulatory 
system, by itself, hurts economic development. At the same time, the 
evidence shows that a stricter regulatory regime actually correlates with a 
greater likelihood of suffering a banking crisis.  Focusing on the kinds of 
regulations a country puts in place can resolve this discrepancy: “Our 
findings indicate that countries with weak governments—that is, 
 
148 The argument that too much regulation stifles growth is clearly implied in the “regulatory 
dividend” said to result from Britain’s light-touch approach.  See supra Part IV.A.  
149 James Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Financial Regulation and Performance: Cross-
Country Evidence 118 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 118, 2001), available at 
http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc118.pdf.   
150 Id. at 33–34 (noting that “a country is considered to have experienced a crisis only when the 
estimated losses [to the government due to banking sector problems] were greater than 5 percent of 
GDP”).   
151 Id. at 4.   
152 Id.   
153 Id. 
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governments that are less likely to (a) supervise banks approximately or (b) 
create proper incentives for private sector participants to supervise banks—
also on average impose harsher restrictions on the activities of banks.”154 
In other words, weaker governments that do not appropriately 
supervise banks or incentivize private sector supervision of banks appear to 
overcompensate for this weakness by imposing harsher restrictions on 
banks.  These harsher restrictions were not merely harsher than 
alternatives.  They were the kind of restrictions that tended to lower the 
value of banks by hampering their ability to diversify assets and 
investments, thereby making them more susceptible to crisis.155 
The Central Bank of Chile study suggests two points relevant to the 
discussion of financial reform.  First, financial regulation, by itself, is not 
likely to be a barrier to economic growth.  Second, the evidence suggests 
that laws or regulations that tend to lower the value of a bank make 
countries imposing those restrictions more likely to suffer economic crisis. 
Although the Central Bank of Chile study found that regulations did 
not necessarily hamper growth, it did find a correlation between harsh 
restrictions and banking crises.  The study suggests that one need not 
follow the cynical or skeptical path of Enriques or John in assessing 
financial reform because the right kinds of regulations do not hamper 
economic growth.  The Review’s recommendations that LIBOR be tied to 
actual market data and that the FSA have broader criminal enforcement 
powers do not appear to limit the kind of activities that add value to banks, 
since they do not preclude banks from diversifying their activities. 
Although nothing in the plethora of regulations faced by banks in the 
United States requires harsher restrictions, the risk of harsher laws or 
regulations seems greater where there are more parties involved, each with 
the potential to impose regulations or sanctions.  Even though the United 
Kingdom has moved on from the light-touch era of regulation, its banks do 
not face anything like the legal and regulatory apparatus in the United 
States.  Ideally, the United States could simplify its regulatory structure to 
more closely resemble that of the United Kingdom.  While the practical and 
political steps needed for the United States to accomplish this 
simplification are outside the bounds of this Note, the empirical evidence in 
the Central Bank of Chile study suggests that reducing the risk of financial 
regulations that are so harsh as to threaten diversification may well be 
worth the practical or political costs. 
 
 
154 Id. at 18. 
155 In general, restrictions that keep banks from diversifying their activities made those countries 
more susceptible to crises.  See id. at 5.  
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The LIBOR scandal illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of 
approaches to banking regulation in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  The light-touch era of financial regulation in the United 
Kingdom was, perhaps, a blessing and a curse: while it may have attracted 
banks to do business in the United Kingdom, it may have also facilitated 
the LIBOR scandal.  Despite the fact that regulators in the United States 
have greater power to pursue criminal sanctions against individual 
manipulators, it remains too difficult to justify the overwhelming 
complication of the U.S. regulatory structure. 
Although neither the United States nor the United Kingdom can stake 
a claim to perfection, the recently adopted recommendations of the 
Wheatley Review in the United Kingdom offer a promising compromise.  
The Review’s recommendations offer solutions to the people, reality, and 
publicity problems presented by the LIBOR scandal without being so harsh 
as to threaten economic growth.  Despite its departure from the light-touch 
approach to financial regulation, the Review’s approach is likely to 
minimize the risk of future manipulation, while not imposing too great a 
cost on financial firms.  The United Kingdom has the better model of 
financial regulation, especially once it enacts the recommendations of the 
Review.  In the future, the United Kingdom will likely continue to enjoy 
the benefits of its simpler regulatory structure, while preventing the 
problems that the LIBOR scandal exposed. 
 
 
